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KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Author(s) -
Stanley Jason
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00136.x
Subject(s) - certainty , epistemology , philosophy , psychology
What is the connection between knowledge and certainty? The question is vexed, in part because there are at least two distinct senses of " certainty ". According to the first sense, subjective certainty, one is certain of a proposition if and only if one has the highest degree of confidence in its truth. According to the second sense of " certainty " , which we may call epistemic certainty, one is certain of a proposition p if and only if one knows that p (or is in a position to know that p) on the basis of evidence that gives one the highest degree of justification for one's belief that p. The thesis that knowledge requires certainty in either of these two senses has been the basis for skeptical arguments. For example, according to one kind of skeptical argument, knowledge requires epistemic certainty, and being epistemically certain of a proposition requires having independent evidence that logically entails that proposition. Since we do not have such evidence for external world propositions, we do not know external world propositions. According to another kind of skeptical argument, due to Peter Unger (1975), knowledge requires subjective certainty, and we are never subjectively certain of any proposition. So, we never know any proposition. Some authors have responded to these skeptical arguments by adopting fallibilism about certainty, the doctrine that having the highest degree of justification for a belief does not involve the possession of logically entailing, non-question begging grounds for that belief (Miller (1978), Klein (1981, Chapter 3)). But my interest in this paper does not lie in rebutting skeptical arguments based upon the assumption that knowledge entails certainty. Rather, my purpose is to establish that knowledge does not require certainty in either of these two senses. Even if we are certain of many things, knowing that p does not entail subjective or epistemic certainty. Since the claim that knowledge requires certainty (in either sense) is closely associated with detrimental conclusions, the central case for the