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HAWTHORNE'S LOTTERY PUZZLE AND THE NATURE OF BELIEF
Author(s) -
Hill Christopher S.,
Schechter Joshua
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00125.x
Subject(s) - lottery , citation , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , library science , economics , microeconomics
Suppose that that T is one of ten million tickets that have been sold in a fair lottery. Clearly the probability that T will lose is extremely high. Suppose that I know these facts. Suppose, too, that T will in fact lose. Given these assumptions, it is tempting to conclude that I can know P, the proposition that T will lose. Certainly the present authors are tempted to conclude this. In his brilliant book Knowledge and Lotteries, however, John Hawthorne makes a strong case for the opposing view. He urges that in everyday contexts speakers are reluctant, or even outright unwilling, to claim that agents know propositions like P. And he buttresses this appeal to conversational data with several powerful theoretical arguments.