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Job Design in the Presence of Career Concerns
Author(s) -
CasasArce Pablo,
Hejeebu Santhi
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00351.x
Subject(s) - discretion , incentive , reputation , dual (grammatical number) , adverse selection , job design , public relations , business , economics , public economics , psychology , actuarial science , microeconomics , sociology , social psychology , political science , job satisfaction , job performance , law , social science , art , literature
We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom to include career concerns. When agents are motivated by their reputation, the discretion to pursue outside activities plays an integral part in the incentive scheme. Discretion can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low‐ability agents. We argue that these synergies are useful in explaining, among other examples, the employment of US faculty members and of physicians in dual health care systems.