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Introduction to the Symposium on Tournaments, Contests, and Relative Performance Evaluation
Author(s) -
Tsoulouhas Theofanis
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00264.x
Subject(s) - incentive , interim , promotion (chess) , principal (computer security) , principal–agent problem , economics , microeconomics , marketing , public economics , business , computer science , political science , management , computer security , law , corporate governance , politics
The papers in this symposium reflect several of the directions taken by current research on tournaments, contests and relative performance evaluation. The papers help us understand the implications of agent heterogeneity on the incentives of agents to perform or self‐select the offers designed for them. They encompass various issues such as career concerns and promotion incentives, interim disclosure of information obtained by the principal about agent performance, exposure to risk choices, and competing for talent .

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