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The Buyer's Option in Multi‐Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at Drouot
Author(s) -
Février Philippe,
Roos William,
Visser Michael
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00084.x
Subject(s) - common value auction , counterfactual thinking , microeconomics , economics , revenue , set (abstract data type) , computer science , finance , philosophy , epistemology , programming language
This paper studies multi‐unit ascending (English) auctions with a buyer's option. The buyer's option gives the winner of an auction the right to purchase any number of units at the winning price. We develop a theoretical model and derive the optimal strategies for the bidders. The model predicts various behavioral implications (e.g., the winner never exercises the option, the price declines…) that are tested using a unique data set on wine auctions held at the Paris‐based auction house Drouot. We also analyze why the buyer's option is used. Estimating the model in a structural econometric way, and using counterfactual comparisons, we find that the buyer's option does not affect the seller's revenue (relative to a system where the units are auctioned sequentially without the option). Drouot, however, saves a lot of time with the option and this effect represents a considerable amount of money. The time‐saving effect seems thus to be the primary purpose of the buyer's option.