Credibility of REDD and Experiences from Papua New Guinea

The concept that developed countries should pay developing countries not to deforest and thus reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been gaining attention over the last few years. Despite the lack of binding commitments from the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, the Copenhagen Accord acknowledges the value of REDD and intends to mobilize funds from developed countries to establish mechanisms to mitigate climate change, including REDD. There is still international support for REDD, but there are concerns whether such schemes are feasible. Whatever happens, there is a clear need to develop more effective, socially inclusive REDD methods. The practical questions associated with implementing REDD are considerable. First, can forest change and degradation (and thus carbon changes) be measured and monitored? Second, can REDD schemes be implemented in the social, economic, and political climates of developing countries that are forested (i.e., poor governance, low transparency, and corruption)? Furthermore, will the benefits from carbon payments reach forest communities? Already, there are concerns that in some African countries REDD funds will merely support ongoing, poor forest management. Similar concerns have been raised about Peru and Indonesia. In fact, some local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) think REDD may threaten forest communities’ usufruct rights. On a brighter note, some technical aspects of REDD look more achievable every day. There have been numerous advances in remote sensing of forest cover in the last decade, and carbon-sequestration modeling is becoming more accurate. Nevertheless, my experience in Papua New Guinea (PNG) suggests too much initial emphasis was placed on carbon accounting and valuation at the expense of community engagement, and this has derailed REDD efforts. The rush by some businesses, NGOs, researchers, and various political interests to establish pilot REDD projects and develop carbon markets has occurred with virtually no involvement or understanding of most of the forest communities. Consequently, in PNG we have seen the attempted development of unregulated carbon deals and preemptive trading. Papua New Guinea makes an interesting case study of REDD for several reasons. First, PNG has been a leader in the promotion of REDD through international lobbying and voluntary forest-carbon projects. Moreover, in PNG all forest lands are under customary ownership, meaning that benefits from REDD could directly reach the forest communities. Thus, PNG may be able to offer the best example of how REDD could and should work. Emissions reductions are not the only goal of REDD; REDD should also further the permanent preservation of forested ecosystems and provide sustainable income for some of the world’s poorest people. If PNG learns from their experiences of the last few years, these REDD aims could still be realized in PNG, and governments in other parts of the world could avoid the problems PNG encountered. Papua New Guinea played a leading role in advancing the REDD agenda internationally. Costa Rica and PNG first introduced REDD into the Conference of the Parties agenda at COP11 in 2005. This introduction led to the decision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 2007 to support the possible future inclusion of REDD in approaches to emissions reductions. Consequently, PNG is a priority country for REDD development for the UN and World Bank. Although PNG was leading on the global stage in the build up to Copenhagen, the carbon-trading scandals within the country eroded its international credibility. In the absence of a national policy on climate change, and due to the lack of internationally accepted standards or mechanisms, REDD projects in PNG have been pioneered by the private sector. The rapid spread of these projects in PNG seemed connected to the lack of clear national policy or guidelines to identify the legal status of carbon ownership or the relevant roles of government agencies. This policy vacuum encouraged speculation, and the notion that customary ownership would allow preemptive buying of carbon rights from communities in the absence of state regulation, something that has led to confusion and exploitation of some rural communities. In PNG all the REDD focus was on money rather than on forest management. Carbon dealers implied fast money from carbon sales would flow to villagers as middle men raced to secure carbon rights from forest communities,