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Institutional arrangements for managing water conflicts in lake basins
Author(s) -
Nickum James E.,
Easter K. William
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
natural resources forum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.646
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1477-8947
pISSN - 0165-0203
DOI - 10.1111/j.1477-8947.1990.tb00519.x
Subject(s) - transferability , government (linguistics) , collective action , incentive , market failure , business , free rider problem , action (physics) , market access , natural resource economics , economics , microeconomics , political science , ecology , law , linguistics , philosophy , physics , public good , quantum mechanics , politics , agriculture , biology
Water conflicts may arise from market failures caused by (i) poor specification or transferability of water rights; (ii) incentive problems such as rent seeking, open access or free riding; or (iii) transactions costs. They may also occur because of failures in non‐market alternatives such as government management. Recent recognition of non‐market failures has led to greater consideration of market‐based approaches to conflict resolution such as tradeable permits or bargaining. It has also enriched our understanding of government‐based approaches. All approaches would appear to benefit from greater attention to promoting collective action by the users of water. For illustration we refer to the problems of lake basins, using several specific examples from Asia.