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FINANCING DECISIONS AND SIGNALING BY PARTIALLY ACQUIRED FIRMS
Author(s) -
Akhigbe Aigbe,
Madura Jeff,
Spencer Carol
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of financial research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.319
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1475-6803
pISSN - 0270-2592
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00820.x
Subject(s) - business , finance , investment (military) , investment decisions , external financing , behavioral economics , politics , political science , law , debt
It is well documented that financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about that firm. Our goal is to determine whether financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about large stakeholders who have a substantial investment in those firms. In particular, we focus on financing decisions by firms after they had been partially acquired to determine whether these decisions signaled information that affected the values of their corresponding partial acquirers. We find that some financing policies by partially acquired firms may not only signal valuable information about themselves, but may also signal valuable information about their corresponding partial acquirers. We also find that the magnitude of the signal for the partially acquired firm that enacts a financing policy is dependent on the degree of monitoring imposed by the respective partial acquirer. JEL classification: G14, G34