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IS THERE A SIGNALING EFFECT OF UNDERWRITER REPUTATION?
Author(s) -
Helou Abe,
Park Gonyung
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
journal of financial research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.319
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1475-6803
pISSN - 0270-2592
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00816.x
Subject(s) - underwriting , reputation , business , equity (law) , monetary economics , economics , finance , political science , law
In this article we examine the effect of underwriter reputation on the abnormal return due to an announcement to issue seasoned new equity. After controlling for other factors that relate asymmetric information to abnormal returns, underwriter reputation still significantly reduces the magnitude of the negative announcement effect. We also develop a procedure to extract a signaling component from the measure of underwriter reputation. We show that the signaling component of underwriter reputation positively and significantly affects abnormal returns. This result supports the notion that issuing firms use underwriter reputation as an effective instrument to signal that their stocks are not overvalued. JEL classification: D82, G24, G30