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REGULATORY AND PROCEDURAL EFFECTS ON THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Author(s) -
AffleckGraves John,
Miller Robert E.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
journal of financial research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.319
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1475-6803
pISSN - 0270-2592
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1989.tb00513.x
Subject(s) - initial public offering , underwriting , business , liability , compensation (psychology) , point (geometry) , monetary economics , finance , accounting , actuarial science , economics , psychology , geometry , mathematics , psychoanalysis
In this paper, the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is examined from the underwriter's point of view. It is shown that because of the regulations and procedures governing the underwriting and pricing of IPOs, underwriters can maximize expected income by underpricing IPOs. Thus, it is argued that in addition to other feasible explanations of the underpricing phenomenon (e.g., compensation to uninformed investors, insurance against legal liability, etc.), regulatory and procedural factors contribute to the underpricing of IPOs. This is shown to be true both when uninformed investors are present and absent from the market for IPOs.