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Auditors’ Liability, Investments, and Capital Markets: A Potential Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act
Author(s) -
DENG MINGCHERNG,
MELUMAD NAHUM,
SHIBANO TOSHI
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of accounting research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.767
H-Index - 141
eISSN - 1475-679X
pISSN - 0021-8456
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00458.x
Subject(s) - business , audit , accounting , sarbanes–oxley act , liability , valuation (finance) , cost of capital , finance , capital market , inherent risk (accounting) , external auditor , economics , internal audit , incentive , microeconomics
To restore investors’ confidence in the reliability of corporate financial disclosures, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandated stricter regulations and arguably increased auditors’ liability. In this paper, we analyze the effects of increased auditor liability on the audit failure rate, the cost of capital, and the level of new investment. We focus on a setting in which, with imperfect auditing, a firm has better information than investors about its prospects and seeks to raise capital for new investments in a lemons market. The equilibrium analysis derives corporate reporting and investing choices by the firm, attestation opinions by the auditor, and valuation by rational investors. Three empirically testable predictions emerge: although increasing auditor liability decreases the audit failure rate and the cost of capital for new projects, it also decreases the level of new profitable investments.