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How the European Union constrains the state: Multilevel governance of taxation
Author(s) -
GENSCHEL PHILIPP,
JACHTENFUCHS MARKUS
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01939.x
Subject(s) - european union , polity , state (computer science) , corporate governance , direct tax , treaty , jurisprudence , member state , european union law , legislation , government (linguistics) , autonomy , economics , double taxation , law and economics , political science , public economics , international taxation , member states , international trade , law , tax reform , politics , finance , linguistics , philosophy , computer science , algorithm
This article challenges the common assumption that the European Union (EU) has little power over taxation. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and European Court of Justice (ECJ) tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, the article shows that the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the Member States' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on Member State taxes than the American federal government imposes on American state taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity that specialises in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves control of highly politicised core functions of government (defence, taxation, social security, education, etc.) to the Member States; despite strong treaty safeguards, national tax autonomy is undermined by EU regulation.