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The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence
Author(s) -
KANG SHINGOO
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00840.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , parliament , government (linguistics) , state (computer science) , politics , prime minister , political science , political economy , public administration , empirical evidence , economics , law , philosophy , linguistics , epistemology , algorithm , computer science
Theories of coalition politics have paid little attention to the role of presidential heads of state in the government‐formation process. This article investigates the influence of presidents on the two most important features of government‐formation outcomes: the identity of the party of the prime minister and the party composition of the coalition. Substantial evidence is found that presidents in European democracies have managed to induce their preferred governments from the potential alternatives. The results also suggest that parliament‐selected presidents and popularly elected presidents have different mechanisms of influence on these outcomes. The investigation sheds new light on the government‐formation process in semi‐presidential as well as in pure parliamentary systems.