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Coordination between electoral arenas in multilevel countries
Author(s) -
LAGO IGNACIO,
MONTERO JOSÉ RAMÓN
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00832.x
Subject(s) - incentive , dilemma , political science , economics , political economy , economic system , public economics , public administration , microeconomics , philosophy , epistemology
This article shows the existence of a coordination dilemma in multilevel countries that hold elections for different parliaments, at different territorial levels and with different electoral rules. With evidence from Spain, the analysis identifies interaction or contamination effects between national and subnational electoral arenas that generate, just as in most mixed‐member electoral systems, a centrifugal force that increases the number of electoral parties in national elections. The incentives that solve this coordination dilemma faced by small regional or local parties are theoretically discussed and empirically tested.