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Making a case for the rational, self‐regarding, ‘ethical’ voter… and solving the ‘Paradox of not voting’ in the process
Author(s) -
OVERBYE EINAR
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00475.x
Subject(s) - voting , reputation , process (computing) , economics , outcome (game theory) , investment (military) , positive economics , bridge (graph theory) , principal (computer security) , politics , political process , sociology , microeconomics , political science , law , social science , computer science , medicine , operating system
. The article offers a new solution to one of the major puzzles facing the public choice‐paradigm: the ‘Paradox of not voting’. Utilizing a principal‐agent model, I argue that voting may be regarded as a rational investment decision: not an investment in a particular electorial outcome, but in a type of reputation which the individual is interested in maintaining when carrying out his/her everyday activities. This solution not only solves the paradox, but may also provide a bridge between adherents of the public choice‐paradigm and scholars who advocate ‘sociological’ approaches to political behaviour.