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The limits of deregulation: Transnational interpenetration and policy change
Author(s) -
CERNY PHILIP G.
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1991.tb01185.x
Subject(s) - deregulation , competition (biology) , politics , state (computer science) , economics , unintended consequences , market economy , welfare state , political economy , intervention (counseling) , market structure , pragmatism , economic system , political science , industrial organization , law , psychology , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , algorithm , psychiatry , computer science , biology
. Deregulation became a major cross‐national trend in the 1980s. Proponents of deregulation have included neoclassicists, pragmatists and certain analysts on the Left and Center‐Left. Deregulation has a number of unintended or unforeseen consequences. A major issue is the development of new, market‐oriented regulations and regulatory structures – the first category of ‘reregulation’. Another is the cross‐national knock‐on effect of regulatory changes. And a third is the emergence of new forms of market stabilization and control, whether by the state or at the transnational level. A crucial feature of deregulation is the change in the wider pattern of state intervention from the ‘welfare state’ model to that of the ‘competition state’. A number of competing explanations for deregulation can be identified – market explanations, institutional/technological explanations and political explanations – each of which has significant variants. These explanations can be seen to apply in the real world at four different levels: the ‘global’ level; that of various intermediary transnational political structures; the state level; and the level of ‘self‐regulation’ of a neo‐corporatist kind.