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Contradictions in market models of politics: the case of party strategies and voter linkages
Author(s) -
WELLHOFER E. SPENCER
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00219.x
Subject(s) - politics , realism , maximization , economics , democracy , universality (dynamical systems) , positive economics , political economy , political science , microeconomics , law , epistemology , physics , quantum mechanics , philosophy
Market models of politics are derived from economic theory where they were advanced in an age of political corruption to achieve four objectives: discipline, universality, liberty and unity in society; only later were such models imported into political discourse. The most pure form of the market model of politics is found in the vote maximization model; yet as a model for political parties and elections, the realism of its assumptions often is held inadequate. While more realistic assumptions generate the vote production model of party strategy, this model rapidly degenerates into the lazy monopolist model which contradicts the role of parties in democracy. The origins of these problems lie in the contradictions within the market ordering principle. Despite these underlying contradictions, market models of politics and parties have gained increasing acceptance both among intellectuals and the general public with numerous implications for the politics of liberal democracies.