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Dominant players and minimum size coalitions
Author(s) -
DEEMEN A.M.A.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1989.tb00196.x
Subject(s) - connection (principal bundle) , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , mathematics , computer science , epistemology , philosophy , geometry
. In this paper we present a result about Peleg's theory of coalition formation in dominated simple games (Peleg 1981). Further, a connection between Peleg's theory and Riker's minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973) is established. This connection leads to a new theory of coalition formation in simple games.