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The Two Effects of District Magnitude: Venezuela as a Crucial Experiment *
Author(s) -
SHUGART MATTHEW F.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1985.tb00131.x
Subject(s) - magnitude (astronomy) , legislature , proportional representation , voting , representation (politics) , demographic economics , political science , economics , econometrics , law , politics , physics , astronomy , democracy
Following Duverger, low district magnitude (low number of seats per electoral district) produces a mechanical effect, the underrepresentation of small parties, and a psychological effect, discouraging voters from voting for small parties. The two effects usually occur together and cannot be tested separately. However, in Venezuela an experimental ‘control’ is provided by the requirement that voters simultaneously cast a vote for the same party in each of three legislative tiers (Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and State Assembly), each with a different district magnitude. Hence the psychological effect can exert itself on only one tier. In the other tiers exceptionally high or low deviations from proportional representation are observed. The separate effects of district magnitude are analysed by their consequences on the number of electoral parties and the deviation from proportional representation.