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Interest Groups and Political X‐inefficiency *
Author(s) -
DEAN JAMES W.
Publication year - 1984
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1984.tb00816.x
Subject(s) - inefficiency , interest group , politics , economics , positive economics , interest rate , special interest group , microeconomics , public economics , law and economics , political science , macroeconomics , law
This paper analyses the Interest Group approach to political choice, an approach that has recently been adopted by economists. The paper argues that Interest Group theorists have overlooked, and sometimes denied, the potential of their approach to distinguish between optimal and non‐optimal (or ‘inefficient’) policy outcomes. The analysis is illustrated with examples from banking regulation.