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SITUATION‐SPECIFIC VERSUS ACTOR‐SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
Author(s) -
JÖNSSON CHRISTER
Publication year - 1978
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1978.tb00802.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , situational ethics , outcome (game theory) , empirical research , focus (optics) , field (mathematics) , bargaining problem , positive economics , microeconomics , economics , sociology , social psychology , psychology , epistemology , social science , mathematics , philosophy , physics , pure mathematics , optics
This article illuminates the existing gap between situation‐specific and actor‐specific approaches to the study of international bargaining. According to game‐theoretically inspired situation‐specific models, situational factors determine the playing and outcome of bargaining games regardless of who the actors are. Actor‐specific models, on the other hand, focus on actor idiosyncrasies as explanatory variables. Certain actors or groups of actors are assumed to negotiate in characteristic ways. Examples of hypotheses derived from each of the two approaches are given, and the lack of rigid empirical tests by which these hypotheses could be validated, invalidated, or modified is noted. The thesis of this article is that the gap between situation‐specific and actor‐specific approaches could, and should, be bridged, and that this requires better coordination than hitherto of theoretical and empirical research in the field of international bargaining. One possible synthesis of actor‐specific and situation‐specific models, based upon the findings of an empirical study of Soviet negotiating behavior, is suggested.