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Unlocking Australia's Contingent Protection Black Box *
Author(s) -
FEAVER DONALD,
WILSON KENNETH
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economic record
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.365
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1475-4932
pISSN - 0013-0249
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1998.tb01904.x
Subject(s) - protectionism , legislation , outcome (game theory) , order (exchange) , dumping , international trade , business , regulatory authority , black box , economics , political science , law , public administration , finance , microeconomics , artificial intelligence , computer science
In this paper, the material injury outcome decisions of the Australian regulatory authority (the Anti‐Dumping Authority) are analyzed in order to determine which factors are influential in determining outcome decisions. The paper tests hypotheses concerning how the Australian authorities decide whether an Australian industry has suffered material injury as required under the relevant Australian legislation and the GATT/WTO obligations. The paper concludes that even though the Australian authorities follow a procedurally correct and GATT‐consistent approach, there is nevertheless some evidence of protectionist bias in favour of domestic industries.