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On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure *
Author(s) -
LONG NGO VAN
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
economic record
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.365
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1475-4932
pISSN - 0013-0249
DOI - 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1994.tb01855.x
Subject(s) - enclosure , inefficiency , enforcement , property (philosophy) , production (economics) , microeconomics , property rights , mathematical economics , economics , law and economics , computer science , law , political science , telecommunications , philosophy , epistemology
This paper demonstrates that the enforcement of property rights by enclosing properties under common access is, in general, socially suboptimal: the timing of enclosure may be inappropriate, causing inefficiency. It is argued that the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics applies for a given collection of production sets, while enclosure implies a choice over collections of production sets