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Can Young People with Autism Refer to Knowledge States? Evidence from Their Understanding of “Know” and “Guess”
Author(s) -
Kazak Sibel,
Collis Glyn M.,
Lewis Vicky
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
journal of child psychology and psychiatry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.652
H-Index - 211
eISSN - 1469-7610
pISSN - 0021-9630
DOI - 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01617.x
Subject(s) - autism , psychology , mainstream , theory of mind , developmental psychology , mental age , mental state , mind blindness , mental health , knowledge level , cognition , cognitive psychology , psychiatry , mathematics education , philosophy , theology
A number of studies have reported that most individuals with autism have difficulty in attributing mental states. The primary aim of the present study was to compare the ability of children with autism to refer to knowledge states with that of mainstream school children and children with Down's syndrome. The second aim was to investigate the role of verbal mental age in referring to knowledge states. The third aim was to compare the ease with which the children referred to their own mental state and to that of others. The results suggest that some individuals with autism are able to attribute knowledge to themselves and others but that they need to have higher verbal skills than is necessary in normal individuals. The level of language skill predicted the performance of the individuals with autism, but not that of the children in the other groups. There was no good evidence that referring to one's own mental states was easier than referring to another person's, a finding which supports representational theory rather than the simulationist position.