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Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on E uropean U nion Hedge Fund Regulation
Author(s) -
Woll Cornelia
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02314.x
Subject(s) - hedge fund , government (linguistics) , salience (neuroscience) , negotiation , battle , economics , business , political science , political economy , law and economics , finance , law , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , archaeology , cognitive psychology , history
The virulent E uropean U nion hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.