Premium
The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area *
Author(s) -
BÉNASSYQUÉRÉ AGNÈS,
TURKISCH EDOUARD
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x
Subject(s) - voting , resizing , convergence (economics) , rotation (mathematics) , taylor rule , economics , monetary policy , international economics , political science , keynesian economics , macroeconomics , mathematics , geometry , law , european union , central bank , politics
We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro‐wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.