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Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three‐Level Game *
Author(s) -
LARSÉN MAGDALENA FRENNHOFF
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00751.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , commission , european commission , political science , outcome (game theory) , international trade , process (computing) , business , economics , european union , computer science , law , microeconomics , operating system
This article develops and uses an adapted version of Putnam's two‐ (extended to three‐) level game model to analyse the EU agenda‐setting process in the negotiations between the EU and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co‐operation Agreement in 1999. The article argues that the model needs to place its domestic focus at the level of the Commission, rather than at the level of the Member States. It demonstrates that the negotiations within the Commission, as well as the location of the Commission negotiating team within DG Development, were central for understanding the EU agenda and the final outcome of the negotiations.