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Explaining EMU Reform
Author(s) -
DONNELLY SHAWN
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00603.x
Subject(s) - economic and monetary union , politics , stability and growth pact , state (computer science) , economics , european monetary union , monetary policy , economic reform , economic policy , political science , pact , economic system , european union , international economics , macroeconomics , member states , law , algorithm , computer science
This article develops a model to explain the roles of national governments in the reform process of rules for economic and monetary union (EMU) in Europe. A study of Germany, France and Spain underlines the importance of electoral politics and institutional arrangements in producing distinctive policy triangles on domestic economic and budget policy, and subsequent demands for specific EMU rules. It employs budget policy analysis to illustrate the collapse of stabilization state politics in France and Germany, leading to the reform of the Stability Pact in March 2005.