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The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
Author(s) -
Bugeja Martin,
Rosa Raymond Da Silva,
Lee Andrew
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of business finance and accounting
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.282
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1468-5957
pISSN - 0306-686X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02115.x
Subject(s) - reputation , business , shareholder , turnover , accounting , corporate governance , finance , management , economics , political science , law
This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post‐takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex‐post settling‐up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.