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Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks
Author(s) -
Lóránth Gyöngyi,
Morrison Alan D.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of business finance and accounting
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.282
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1468-5957
pISSN - 0306-686X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.02002.x
Subject(s) - deposit insurance , diversification (marketing strategy) , business , multinational corporation , monetary economics , financial system , incentive , finance , capital requirement , capital (architecture) , liability , economics , market economy , archaeology , marketing , history
Banking sector globalization has caused an expansion in foreign‐owned bank assets. In this paper we analyse the effects of a MNB's liability structure upon its investment in a foreign country. We develop a model in which capital adequacy requirements introduce some deliberate underinvestment which counters deposit insurance‐induced overinvestment. Diversification is unattractive with fixed bank capital requirements, because it reduces the expected value of the deposit insurance net. This effect applies in multinational banks (MNBs), where shocks to the home country economy alter the value of the deposit insurance net and hence affect overseas lending incentives. Thus, MNBs act as a channel for financial contagion. We discuss the policy implications of our results.