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Hanly on Coase: A Comment
Author(s) -
MEDEMA STEVEN G.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00095.x
Subject(s) - coase theorem , externality , normative , economics , social cost , reciprocal , morality , law and economics , government (linguistics) , positive economics , sociology , neoclassical economics , microeconomics , law , transaction cost , political science , philosophy , linguistics
Ken Hanly's recent article in this Journal (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1992) takes issue with Ronald Coase's approach to resolving problems of externalities, as set forth in his classic paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. I argue that Hanly's discussion of Coase misinterprets or inappropriately rejects certain aspects of Coase's analysis, specifically, with regard to the reciprocal nature of externalities and the economic role of government. The resolution of externality problems is presented as an issue of selective normative choice as to whose interests are to count; neither efficiency nor morality claims are uniquely dispositive of the issue.