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Complexity and the Value of Lives—some philosophical dangers for mentally handicapped people
Author(s) -
FAIRBAIRN GAVIN J.
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00283.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , value (mathematics) , offensive , epistemology , preference , psychology , knight , mentally retarded , non human , simple (philosophy) , sociology , social psychology , philosophy , developmental psychology , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , management , astronomy , machine learning , computer science , economics , microeconomics
In his book The End of Life James Rachels argues that in a situation of forced choice if we must choose between a more and a less complex human being we have good reason to choose in favour of the normal human. He argues also that since some humans have less complex mental abilities than some animals it will sometimes be right to choose a non‐human animal in preference to a human being. I do not consider Rachels’belief that sometimes non‐human animals are to be preferred to retarded humans; I focus rather on the seemingly less contentious belief that in situations of forced choice, we should choose human beings with more rather than less complex lives. I reject this contention both because Rachels does not seem to have offered a worthwhile argument in its favour and also because I find his cavalier approach to the lives of people with intellectual disabilities morally offensive. En route I argue against his simplistic separation of human lives into the categories ‘simple’and ‘complex’on the basis of whether the individuals in question fall into what he seems to take as given—the clear cut categories ‘mentally retarded’and ‘normal’[1] [2].