From Minds Hidden in the Heads of Individuals to the Use of Mind‐Talk between Us: Wittgensteinian Developmental Investigations 1

I criticize Carpendale and Lewis's (2004) attempt to produce a Wittgensteinian theory , as an alternative to work in the “theory of mind” (TOM) tradition, not because I disagree with it as theory, but because Wittgenstein would be critical of any attempt to make such a use of his work. Theories are concerned with discovering rules, principles, of lawful regularities hidden behind appearances. Wittgenstein's whole latter philosophy is inimical to such an aim. His concern is not with theories but with descriptions—which can be explanatory, but in a relational or orientational rather than a causal fashion. Below, I give some initial examples to show what Wittgensteinian investigations in developmental psychology might look like.