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The Concept of Consciousness 4 The Reflective Meaning
Author(s) -
NATSOULAS THOMAS
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
journal for the theory of social behaviour
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.615
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1468-5914
pISSN - 0021-8308
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5914.1994.tb00261.x
Subject(s) - consciousness , meaning (existential) , epistemology , psychology , remainder , cognitive science , philosophy , mathematics , arithmetic
In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary (“the OED”) defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness 4 . by (a) identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and (b) by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is related to the referents of the concept of consciousness 4 . I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness 4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self‐intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner‐eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today.