Premium
Weber's alleged emotivism
Author(s) -
Tester Keith
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
the british journal of sociology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.826
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1468-4446
pISSN - 0007-1315
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-4446.1999.00563.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , sociology , reading (process) , politics , preference , philosophy , law , political science , economics , microeconomics
This paper seeks to refute Alasdair Maclntyre's contention that the sociology of Max Weber is emotivist. Maclntyre understands emotivism to involve the collapse of all moral judgment into statements of personal preference. It is shown that Weber's sociology analyses this condition and seeks to repudiate it. In no way does Weber embrace emotivism. Maclntyre misses Weber's repudiation because he misreads Weber's sociological project. The paper shows that Maclntyre's reading of Weber can be refuted if attention is paid to the ‘Politics as a Vocation’ lecture.