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Social protection: An obstacle to employment?
Author(s) -
Walwei Ulrich,
Zika Gerd
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
international social security review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.349
H-Index - 28
eISSN - 1468-246X
pISSN - 0020-871X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-246x.1997.tb01081.x
Subject(s) - layoff , social security , social protection , employment protection legislation , obstacle , legislation , labour economics , wage , social policy , ambivalence , economics , flexicurity , business , unemployment , political science , market economy , economic growth , law , psychology , social psychology
This article examines the ambivalent effect of social security on employment. First, an international comparison looks at protection from layoff by the employer, wage floors as defined in social and employment legislation, and levels of wage‐related costs and their effect on employment. Simulations for western Germany are then used to analyse the effects on the labour market of lowering social security contributions. The conclusion which emerges is that the effects of social protection on employment are determined both by the way it is organized – and thus ultimately how much it costs – and by the way it is funded, i.e. who picks up the bill for social security.