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Voluntary Cooperation in Terms of International Financial Supervision
Author(s) -
Diev Pavel
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
international review of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.489
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-2443
pISSN - 1369-412X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01139.x
Subject(s) - externality , incentive , scope (computer science) , negotiation , public good , turnover , simple (philosophy) , developing country , distribution (mathematics) , economics , business , international economics , public economics , microeconomics , economic growth , political science , mathematical analysis , philosophy , mathematics , management , epistemology , computer science , law , programming language
This article analyzes the issue of voluntary cooperation in terms of international financial supervision. A simple modeling framework is provided where financial supervision is an international public good and thus may be underprovided globally. The article asks a simple question: would national supervisors cooperate and increase the level of global supervision, and by how much? I use coalition formation game theory to address this question. The main results are the following. If the situation is completely symmetric (identical‐sized countries and symmetric externalities), the amount of cooperation is relatively high and full cooperation could be achieved for particular numbers of countries involved in the negotiations. However, in general, full cooperation would not be an equilibrium because countries have incentives to free ride on the cooperation of other countries. Introducing asymmetries in the size of the countries and/or in the externalities between countries reduces the scope for cooperation. However, higher asymmetries are not necessarily related to lower cooperation if the distribution of asymmetries has a particular shape, such that big countries are generating large externalities on small countries, as it might be the case in reality.