Premium
On the Consequences of Frequent Applicants in Adverse Impact Analyses: A demonstration study
Author(s) -
Dunleavy Eric M.,
Mueller Lorin M.,
Buonasera Ash K.,
Kuang Daniel C.,
Dunleavy Dana Glenn
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
international journal of selection and assessment
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.812
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1468-2389
pISSN - 0965-075X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2389.2008.00439.x
Subject(s) - promotion (chess) , workforce , adverse effect , adverse selection , psychology , affect (linguistics) , personnel selection , applied psychology , actuarial science , medicine , statistics , business , economics , mathematics , communication , politics , political science , law , economic growth
Electronic résumés, online applications, and automated personnel systems have reduced the effort required for a candidate to apply for employment opportunities like selection and promotion. The nature of these systems may affect analyses of adverse impact. For example, candidates that can easily apply to many positions multiple times could strongly influence analyses of adverse impact under particular circumstances. This study demonstrates some potential consequences of including frequent applicants in adverse impact analyses. Using workforce simulation methodology, we illustrate some conditions where a lesser qualified frequent applicant substantially influences the statistical significance of adverse impact detection. In some cases, the adverse impact against a subgroup may be accounted for by a single frequent applicant; in other cases, statistically significant adverse impact may be disguised by a single frequent applicant. We also consider methods for identifying frequent applicants and present options for handling these cases in analyses.