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SOCIALLY OPTIMAL SUBSIDIES FOR ENTRY: THE CASE OF MEDICARE PAYMENTS TO HMOs *
Author(s) -
Maruyama Shiko
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00621.x
Subject(s) - subsidy , inefficiency , counterfactual thinking , welfare , public economics , economics , restructuring , payment , incentive , business , microeconomics , finance , philosophy , epistemology , market economy
The U.S. Medicare program has increased its spending on private Medicare plans in anticipation of larger consumer surplus and higher efficiency. To evaluate the welfare consequences of such policy interventions, I develop an empirical model with endogenous entry. Counterfactual simulation reveals the following: subsidizing HMO entry can be justified to enhance national welfare (no excessive entry); the level of price subsidies in 2008, however, is far beyond the optimal level; and the geographic inconsistency between the subsidies and the Medicare fee‐for‐service costs is another source of inefficiency. Resolving this geographic inconsistency significantly raises national welfare by restructuring entry.