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ON MAJORITARIAN BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION *
Author(s) -
Tsai TsungSheng,
Yang C. C.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x
Subject(s) - complete information , revelation , economics , politics , horizon , type (biology) , mathematical economics , incomplete contracts , microeconomics , political science , philosophy , mathematics , law , theology , ecology , geometry , biology , incentive
This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's ( American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence's signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay.