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FORMAL HOME HEALTH CARE, INFORMAL CARE, AND FAMILY DECISION MAKING *
Author(s) -
Byrne David,
Goeree Michelle S.,
Hiedemann Bridget,
Stern Steven
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00566.x
Subject(s) - consumption (sociology) , set (abstract data type) , work (physics) , outcome (game theory) , public economics , health care , business , microeconomics , economics , quality (philosophy) , nash equilibrium , actuarial science , economic growth , computer science , sociology , programming language , mechanical engineering , social science , philosophy , epistemology , engineering
We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game‐theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest.