Premium
Exercising power in a prisoner's dilemma: transnational collective bargaining in an era of corporate globalisation?
Author(s) -
Cooke William N.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
industrial relations journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.525
H-Index - 3
eISSN - 1468-2338
pISSN - 0019-8692
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2338.2005.00359.x
Subject(s) - dilemma , bargaining power , competitor analysis , incentive , collective bargaining , foreign direct investment , prisoner's dilemma , power (physics) , globalization , market economy , economics , investment (military) , labour economics , economic system , business , international trade , political economy , political science , microeconomics , game theory , law , politics , management , epistemology , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , macroeconomics
The extraordinary growth in foreign direct investment coupled with the widespread declination of union penetration has increasingly allowed multinationals to pit unions across borders as competitors for investment and jobs. Based on a theoretical analysis of the exercise of power in a prisoner's dilemma game, the essential conditions and incentives for cooperation among unions across borders for the purpose of collective bargaining with multinationals are identified and practical, strategic‐level implications for transnational interunion partnerships are addressed.