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Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects
Author(s) -
HIRSCH BORIS,
SCHANK THORSTEN,
SCHNABEL CLAUS
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
industrial relations: a journal of economy and society
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.61
H-Index - 57
eISSN - 1468-232X
pISSN - 0019-8676
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-232x.2010.00617.x
Subject(s) - monopoly , set (abstract data type) , business , labour economics , actuarial science , economics , demographic economics , market economy , computer science , programming language
Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.