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Injured Workers’ Underreporting in the Health Care Industry: An Analysis Using Quantitative, Qualitative, and Observational Data
Author(s) -
GALIZZI MONICA,
MIESMAA PETRA,
PUNNETT LAURA,
SLATIN CRAIG
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
industrial relations: a journal of economy and society
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.61
H-Index - 57
eISSN - 1468-232X
pISSN - 0019-8676
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-232x.2009.00585.x
Subject(s) - observational study , workers' compensation , occupational safety and health , reputation , moral hazard , health care , qualitative property , compensation (psychology) , environmental health , business , hazard , survey data collection , actuarial science , psychology , medicine , incentive , economics , social psychology , political science , economic growth , statistics , law , chemistry , mathematics , organic chemistry , pathology , microeconomics
Underreporting of occupational injuries was examined in four health care facilities using quantitative, qualitative, and observational data. Occupational Safety and Health Administration logs accounted for only one‐third of the workers’ compensation records; 45 percent of injured workers followed by survey had workers’ compensation claims. Workers reported 63 percent of serious occupational injuries. Underreporting is explained by time pressure and workers’ doubts about eligibility, reputation, income loss, and career prospects. Though aware of underreporting, managers subtly believe in workers’ moral hazard behaviors.