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Oliver Cromwell and the Performance of Parliament's Armies in the Newbury Campaign, 20 October–21 November 1644
Author(s) -
WANKLYN MALCOLM
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
history
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.12
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1468-229X
pISSN - 0018-2648
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-229x.2010.00504.x
Subject(s) - victory , parliament , royalist , battle , spanish civil war , blame , rivalry , adversary , law , officer , political science , politics , history , ancient history , psychology , economics , macroeconomics , psychiatry , statistics , mathematics
Traditionally historians have accepted Cromwell's explanation for the failure of Parliament's generals to win a decisive victory in the Newbury campaign, and thus bring an effective end to the First English Civil War by destroying the last of the king's field armies. Cromwell blamed his commanding officer the earl of Manchester, who avoided excellent opportunities to engage with the enemy in order to further his aspiration that the war should be ended by negotiations rather than by outright victory for Parliament. This article examines various factors that might explain why the Newbury campaign ended in the way that it did: rivalry between the generals, the military expertise of the royalist commanders, the landscape, the weather and the time of year, command and control, and the relative strength and battle‐worthiness of the opposing armies. It concludes that Cromwell bears more of the blame than Manchester for the campaign's failure. It also suggests that Cromwell's inactivity was deliberate as in terms of their war aims the Independents had most to lose from outright victory in the autumn of 1644.