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P rocessio and The Place of Ontic Being: J ohn M ilbank and J ames K . A . S mith On Participation
Author(s) -
Triffett Brendan Peter
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
the heythrop journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.127
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1468-2265
pISSN - 0018-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2012.00770.x
Subject(s) - ontic , subject (documents) , creatures , philosophy , ontology , metaphysics , theology , epistemology , computer science , history , archaeology , library science , natural (archaeology)
J ames K . A . S mith argues that the ontology of participation associated with R adical O rthodoxy is incompatible with a C hristian affirmation of the intrinsic being and goodness of creatures. In response, he proposes a L eibnizian view in which things are endowed with the innate dynamism of ‘force’. Creatures have a certain depth of being, and are intrinsically good, just because they each have an inner virtuality that they bring into expression. Such force is said to be a metaphysical component of the agent. In this paper it is asked whether John Milbank's ontology of participation can be defended by distinguishing between two senses of being a subject. Perhaps it is possible for a creature to bring into expression what is an infused ‘alien’ gift rather than a metaphysical component – to be expressive subject, but not ontic subject, for divine power. However, while this distinction promises to make sense of the reception of an indwelling ‘other’ in grace, knowledge and love, neither proper substance nor proper existence can be received in this way. A creature must be the ontic subject for its being, after all. Still, divine being might proceed from God as radical indwelling gift, as non‐ontic ground for ontic being.