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IS THERE A TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?
Author(s) -
BURLEY MIKEL
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
the heythrop journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.127
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1468-2265
pISSN - 0018-1196
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00470.x
Subject(s) - proposition , philosophy , nothing , faith , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , religious belief , philosophy of religion , theology , chemistry , biochemistry
This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method.