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Managing the Bank‐System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies: Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan
Author(s) -
SVENSSON TORSTEN,
MABUCHI MASARU,
KAMIKAWA RYUNOSHIN
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2006.00303.x
Subject(s) - blame , deregulation , credibility , order (exchange) , government (linguistics) , administration (probate law) , financial crisis , financial system , politics , agency (philosophy) , economics , economic policy , business , private sector , finance , market economy , political science , economic growth , sociology , psychology , social science , linguistics , philosophy , psychiatry , law , macroeconomics
Sweden and Japan represent two different positions regarding policymaking when faced with similar crises of the bank systems. Different institutional settings led the main actors to different paths of reactions in order to avoid blame. In the Japanese case, the very close relationship between private banks and the Ministry of Finance, in combination with the lesser degree of widespread perceptions of a system crisis, made it more urgent as well as possible to conceal the actual state of affairs for the politicians. Confronted with the threat of losing power over the financial administration to a new agency, the ministry postponed the reforms in order to conceal the deep financial problems. The institutional setting was different in Sweden. Deregulation had separated the government from the administration of banks. Among the public deteriorating economic conditions were easily connected to the banks. This brought about political unity. It was possible to put the blame on the banks and take the credit for the efforts to tidy up the mess without losing credibility.