Regulatory Competition and the Politics of Financial Market Reform in Britain and Japan

This article examines the impact that the internationalization of jnance has had on the regulation of domestic securities markets in Japan and Britain. In particular, it seeks to explain the apparent incompatibility of two distinct trends: deregulation (and state retreat) on the one hand, and increased regulation and state involvement in markets on the other. Much of the literature about the efects of internationalization on domestic policymaking has drfjculty explaining these two distinct regulatory frends. First, there has been no uniform “competition in regulatory laxity.” Second, the United States does not appear to have exerted hegemonic influence over outcomes. Finally, domestic‐level explanations which deny the importance of systemic‐level influences on domestic policy choices are unable to explain the similarity of policy choices undertaken by governments with very different regulatory traditions. I argue instead that regulatory reforms have been undertaken primarily for the benefit of a particular set of private economic actors—mobile consumers of financial services, including both holders of liquid investment capital and large multinational borrowers. Internationalization has systematically strengthened their influence over the policymaking process by making “exit” from one political marketplace to another a more realistic and more potent bargaining strategy than the alternative of exercising “voice.”