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The State as Architect of Political Order: Policy Dynamics in German Health Care
Author(s) -
DÖHLER MARIAN
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1995.tb00216.x
Subject(s) - veto , politics , legislature , state (computer science) , german , order (exchange) , public administration , government (linguistics) , representation (politics) , power (physics) , political science , health care , economics , law , computer science , linguistics , philosophy , physics , archaeology , finance , algorithm , quantum mechanics , history
The focus of this article is on the state as an actor that can create, rearrange or even destroy established structures of interest representation. Through small, often almost overlooked, and sometimes even failed interventions, governmental policies create a legacy that can serve as a springboard for further political action. This policy dynamic is triggered by “architectural” activities of the state, aiming at the structure of the interest group system. This kind of policy bears the potential not only to manipulate the structure, but also the preferences and strategies of interest groups so as to overcome their veto‐power. The case of German health care reform policies since the late 1970s is used to illustrate how suck a kind of governmental “design” has exerted a decisive impact on the structure of the policy field, culminating in an unexpected legislative success for the federal government. 1